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COMMERCIALLY UNREASONABLE
REPOSSESSION SALES IN OKLAHOMA:
WILKERSON MOTOR CO. V JOHtNSON
I. INTRODUCTION
In Wilkerson Motor Co. v. Johnson,' the Oklahoma Supreme
Court dealt directly with the issue of how much advertising a secured
creditor must do in announcing a public sale of repossessed goods in
order to meet the standard of "commercial reasonableness" set out in
section 9-504(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.).2 The court
clearly indicated that a creditor will not be safe in relying on the proce-
dures mandated by pre-Code law for conducting a foreclosure sale.
But a possibly more significant aspect of the decision is that Wilkerson
appears to be the first reported case that allows the debtor simultane-
ously to use the secured creditor's failure to comply with U.C.C. section
9-504 both as a sword to collect damages under U.C.C. section 9-507(1)
and as a shield to defend against a deficiency judgment under section
9-504(2).
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Wilkerson case started out following a very familiar defi-
ciency judgment format. The defendant-debtor bought an automobile
from the plaintiff-secured creditor. The debtor signed a retail install-
ment sales contract for $3,800 and gave a security interest back to the
seller. The debtor later defaulted. The creditor repossessed the car
and notified the debtor that it would be sold at public auction and that
the debtor would be held liable for any resulting deficiency. The par-
ties stipulated that the repossession and notice to the debtor were
1. 580 P.2d 505 (Okla. 1978).
2. Uniform Commercial Code (1962 version) [hereinafter U.C.C.]. In Oklahoma, OKLA.
STAT. tit. 12A, §§ 1-101-10-104 (1971 & Supp. 1977).
3. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, §§ 51-75 (1963). (repealed 1961). Seeparltcularly § 54: Post-
ing and Mailing Notice.---'Such notice shall be posted in three public places in the county where
the property is to be sold at least 10 days before the time therein specified for such sale and one
notice shall be mailed to the mortgagor at his last known address by registered mail on the day of
posting."
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proper and complied with the relevant provisions of the U.C.C.4 The
controversy arose over the manner in which the creditor advertised the
auction to the public. The creditor's only advertising was the posting
of three notices in downtown Tulsa. There were no newspaper ads,
and the creditor did not notify any other car dealers of the impending
auction. Predictably, no one came to the auction except the creditor,
who bought the car for $2,000. (At that point it has a "blue book" or
wholesale value of $2.575.) 5
The creditor added the $2,000 to the amount the debtor had al-
ready paid and sued for the remaining deficiency of approximately
$850. The debtor responded with a counterclaim for $982.82 in dam-
ages resulting from the improper sale of the collateral.6 Both sides
sought attorney fees.
The case went to the jury under an instruction which the
Oklahoma Supreme Court said "denied [the creditor] the flexibility af-
forded it as a secured party under the UCC, and was inapplicable to
the facts of the case at bar."7 The jury both denied the creditor a defi-
ciency judgment and awarded the debtor the full amount on his coun-
terclaim.
The supreme court addressed itself primarily to the issue of the
commercial reasonableness of the public sale. They held that although
the jury instruction on commercial reasonableness was erroneous, there
was no reversible error because the creditor's conduct was so far short
of the appropriate standard that it could be held to be commercially
unreasonable as a matter of law.' On the issue of whether or not the
creditor's conduct can be both a defense to a deficiency and an affirma-
tive cause of action, the result is less clear. The court said:
Appellant's [the creditor] second proposition was that the
trial court should have sustained its motion for a directed ver-
dict on its petition for a deficiency judgment. This argument is
predicated on an asserted absence of evidence to support re-
covery by the appellee on his cross-petition. As illustrated by
the foregoing discussions, [indicating that the sale was unrea-
sonable as a matter of law,] the contention is without merit.9
4. 580 P.2d at 506. The relevant Code sections are U.C.C. § 9-503 (repossesion) and U.C.C.§ 9-504(3) (notice).
5. Id at 506.
6. Id See id. at 506 n.2.
7. Id. at 507.
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The court then affirmed the trial court's judgment.
The purpose of this note is to examine the impact of the Wilkerson
decision on the definition of commercial reasonableness in Oklahoma
and the effect of a finding that a secured creditor has failed to meet this
standard.
III. A BRIEF FLOW CHART OF ARTICLE NINE, PART FIVE
A secured creditor's rights upon a debtor's default are set forth in
U.C.C. section 9-501, which provides that the secured creditor may ei-
ther sue on the underlying debt, reducing it to a judgment, and allow
the sheriff to sell whatever property is levied upon in execution of the
judgment, or that the secured party may repossess the collateral di-
rectly, or both.10 If he repossesses, he may still have a choice to make.
If the debtor has paid less than sixty percent of the contract price or has
elected not to require a sale of the collateral," the creditor may either
retain the collateral in satisfaction of the debt, or he may dispose of the
collateral and hold the debtor responsible for any difference between
the proceeds of the disposition and the secured debt. If the creditor
elects to retain the goods, his rights are governed by U.C.C. section 9-
505. This section basically provides that the secured party must dis-
pose of the collateral if the debtor has paid sixty percent or more of the
cash price. If the debtor has paid less than this amount, the creditor
has the option of retaining the collateral in satisfaction of the remain-
der of the obligation, absent objection from the creditor.'2
10. U.C.C. § 9-501 provides in pertinent part:
(1) When a debtor is in default under a security agreement, a secured party has the
rights and remedies provided in this Part.... He may reduce his claim to judgment,
foreclose or otherwise enforce the security interest by any available judicial proce-
dure .... The rights and remedies referred to in this subsection are cumulative.
(5) When a secured party has reduced his claim to judgment the lien of any levy
which may be made upon his collateral by virtue of any execution based upon the judg-
ment shall relate back to the date of the perfection of the security interest in such collat-
eral. Ajudicial sale, pursuant to such execution, is a foreclosure of the security interest
by judicial procedure within the meaning of this section, and the secured party may
purchase at the sale and thereafter hold the collateral free of any other requirements of
this Article.
11. U.C.C. § 9-505. See note 12 infra for the text thereof.
12. The Oklahoma version of U.C.C. § 9-505 provides in pertinent part:
(1) If the debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash price... and has not signed
after default a statement renouncing or modifying his rights under this Part a secured
party who has taken possession of collateral must dispose of it under Section 9-504....
(2) In any other case... a secured party in possession may, after default, propose
to retain the collateral in satisfaction of the obligation. Written notice of such proposal
shall be sent to the debtor and. . .to any other secured party.. .who has duly filed a
financing statement.. .in this state.. . . If the debtor or other person entitled to receive
[Vol. 13:820
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If the creditor either elects to dispose of the collateral or is re-
quired to do so by section 9-505, his rights and duties are governed by
section 9-504, which provides that the proceeds of any disposition of
the collateral shall be applied to defray costs, the remainder of the debt,
and the amount owed to subordinate creditors, if any. This section
also states that any surplus must be repaid to the debtor, and con-
versely, that any deficiency remaining must be made up by the
debtor. 13
The court in Wilkerson recognized, as have other courts and com-
mentators, that the commercial reasonableness standard is at best elu-
sive. 14 The only guidelines found in the Code are in section 9-507(2)
which states:
(2) The fact that a better price could have been ob-
tained by a sale at a different time or in a different method
from that selected by the secured party is not of itself suffi-
cient to establish that the sale was not made in a commercially
notification objects in writing within thirty days after the secured party obtains posses-
sion, the secured party must dispose of the collateral under Section 9-504. In the ab-
sence of such written objection the secured party may retain the collateral in satisfaction
of the debtor's obligation.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12A, § 9-505 (1971).
13. U.C.C. § 9-504 provides in part:
(1) A secured party after default may sell, lease or other wise dispose of any or all
of the collateral .... The proceeds of disposition shall be applied in the following order
to
(a) the reasonable expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling
and the like and, to the extent provided for in the agreement and not pro-
hibited by law, the reasonable attorneys' fees and legal expenses incurred
by the secured party;
(b) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by the security interest under
which the disposition is made;
(c) the satisfaction of indebtedness secured by any subordinate security inter-
est....
(2) If the security interest secures an indebtedness, the secured party must account
to the debtor for any surplus, and unless otherwise agreed, the debtor is liable for any
deficiency....
(3) Disposition of the collateral may be by public or private proceedings and may
be made by way of one or more contracts. Sale or other disposition may be as a unit or
in parcels and at any time and place and on any terms but every aspect of the disposition
including the method, manner, time, place and terms must be commercially reasonable.
Unless collateral is perishable or threatens to decline speedily in value or is of a type
customarily sold on a recognized market, reasonable notification of the time and place of
any public sale or reasonable notification of the time after which any private sale or
other intended disposition is to be made shall be sent by the secured party to the
debtor. . . . The secured party may buy at any public sale....
14. 580 P.2d at 508. See Hall v. Owen Street Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 929 (Ind. Ct. App.
1977); In re Zsa Zsa, Ltd., 352 F. Supp. 665, 669-70 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Graham v. Northwestern
Bank, 16 N.C. App. 287, 289, 192 S.E,2d 109, 111 (1972); 1 COOGAN, HOGAN, & VAGTS, SECURED
TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, § 804(2)(a) (1968); Siegel, The Com-
merelaly Reasonable Disposition of Collateral, 80 COM. L.J 67 (1975).
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reasonable manner. If the secured party either sells the col-
lateral in the usual manner in any recognized market therefor
or if he sells at the price current in such market at the time of
his sale or if he has otherwise sold in conformity with reason-
able commercial practices among dealers in the type of prop-
erty sold he has sold in a commercially reasonable manner.
One can hardly fault a creditor who is not certain what standards
the Code requires for a commercially reasonable resale of the collat-
eral. Uncertainty notwithstanding, it is critically important that he
meet those standards. Should he fail, the Code provides that the
debtor may recover damages, and if the collateral was consumer goods,
the Code provides for minimum damages "not less than. . . the time
price differential plus 10 per cent of the cash price."'' 5
Other than affording the debtor the right to collect damages, the
Code does not say what the effect of the creditor's failure to sell in a
commercially reasonable manner is, and the jurisdictions are not at all
in agreement on the point. The Wilkerson decision implies that
Oklahoma has taken a position in this controversy and has added some
clarification to the term "commercial reasonableness." This article
will deal with those two aspects of the case in reverse order.
IV. COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS AND ADVERTISING THE
RESALE
The creditor in Wilkerson elected to dispose of the collateral by
conducting a public sale or auction. He was therefore faced with the
problem of determining what a commercially reasonable public sale
was. More specifically, he was confronted with a problem in deciding
how extensively to advertise the sale. Certainly some notice to the
public is and always has been an element of a "public" sale. 6 How-
ever, if the seller goes overboard in his advertising, he may be accused
of inflating the cost of the resale for which the debtor will be responsi-
ble.17 Similarly, the seller must be concerned with the fact that the
debtor who was unable to pay his debt in the first place may not be able
to pay the costs of the resale and that the creditor may be spending his
15. U.C.C. § 9-507(1).
16. Cases which have arisen under the U.C.C. include: Koubuk Eng'r & Contracting Serv.,
Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr., 568 P.2d 1007 (Alaska 1977), Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv.
Co., 560 P.2d 917 (Nev. 1977); Foster v. Knutson, 84 Wash. 2d 538, 527 P.2d 1108 (1974). For a
collection of pre-Code cases see Annot., 4 A.L.R.2d 575 (1949).
17. Davis v. Small Business Inv. Co., 535 S.W.2d 740, 744 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976). See also II
G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 42.5 at 1138 (1965).
[Vol. 13:820
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own advertising dollars for someone else's benefit with no hope of re-
couping his loss.
Wilkerson Motor Co. however did not go overboard in advertising
for this sale. The secured creditor there posted three public notices
along the streets of downtown Tulsa."8 This choice of advertising
methods was not accidental. It was precisely the method of advertising
a public sale that was required by pre-Code Oklahoma law,19 the Uni-
form Conditional Sales Act,2" and it has been the traditional method of
publicizing distress sales.21 Additionally, the legislature of North Caro-
lina, recognizing the uncertainty of the Code's standards, added an ad-
ditional part to Article Nine which sets minimum standards for a
repossession sale that would conclusively be commercially reason-
able.22 The standard chosen by the North Carolina legislature was one
notice posted on a bulletin board provided at the county courthouse.23
Thus, Wilkerson Motor Co. might well have been more than just a little
surprised to hear the Oklahoma Supreme Court say that no reasonable
jury could believe that their method of advertising was commercially
reasonable. This is particularly true when one considers the language
of the Oklahoma U.C.C. comments24 (cited in the court's opinion)25
which state that the purpose of the Code's standard is to allow the seller
more flexibility in disposing of the collateral.
This should not be taken to mean, however, that the court reached
the wrong conclusion. Although this appears to be the first reported
case where a court has held that compliance with the pre-Code formula
was not commercially reasonable, there are a number of decisions
which deal with deficient advertising. As mentioned earlier, where
there was no advertising of the sale whatsoever, the sale could be chal-
lenged as not being a "public" sale at all,26 or alternatively, as a com-
18. 580 P.2d at 506 n.l.
19. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 46, § 54 (1954) (repealed 1961). See note 3 supra for the text
thereof.
20. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 19. The act did require publication in a general circu-
lation newspaper if the collateral was worth $500. In saying that these ads complied with the
statute, inflation must be considered. A used car during the time of the Conditional Sales Act
generally would not have cost more than $500. One should also note that county legal bulletins
have been held to be general circulation newspapers so that the level of protection thus afforded
was not very significant. See Bulldog Concrete Form Sales Corp. v. Taylor, 94 F. Supp. 328, 331
(D. Ind. 1949), aI'd, 195 F.2d 417 (7th Cir. 1952).
21. Valley Nat'l Bank v. Brooks, 3 Ariz. App. 340, 414 P.2d 189 (1966).
22. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-9-601 through 25-9-607 (Supp. 1977).
23. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-9-603 (SupP. 1977).
24. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-504 (1963), OKLAHoMA COMMENT 3.
25. 580 P.2d at 507.
26. Koubuk Eng'r. & Contracting Serv., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Constr., 568 P.2d 1007
1978]
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mercially unreasonable sale. 7 Similarly there are cases that indicate
the standard has not been met when the notices were either inaccu-
rate28 or incomplete.2 9 The modem cases clearly indicate that the meas-
ure of the sufficiency of the resale's publicity is not how many bidders
came30 or how much they bid,31 but rather, whether or not the seller
used due diligence in acquiring the best price for the mutual benefit of
both the debtor and creditor.32 Thus, the Oklahoma decision is clearly
in line with the national trend of requiring the secured party to protect
both parties' interests rather than requiring the debtor to insure that a
fair price was received at the auction. A number of pre-Code cases
had indicated that the debtor's primary protection was the requirement
that the creditor give the debtor sufficient advance notice of the sale to
allow him either to publicize the sale or to attend and bring his own
buyers.33 Judicial unhappiness with this approach caused pre-Code
courts to scrutinize these sales more closely, particularly when the se-
cured party himself was the buyer,34 or when there was other evidence
of collusion or self-dealing, 35 and caused at least one commentator to
call for the abolition of such practices in the case of consumer sales.36
Even in North Carolina, where the legislature adopted presumptively
reasonable minimum standards, the courts have shown hostility to se-
cured creditors who do not evidence some diligence in securing bidders
at their sales. Although those courts are willing to enforce the pre-
sumptive standard when the buyer is able to show exact compliance,37
(Alaska 1977); Levers v. Rio King Land & Inv. Co., 560 P.2d 917 (Nev. 1977); Foster v. Knutson,
84 Wash. 2d 538, -, 527 P.2d 1108, 114 (1974).
27. Dynaclectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659 (W.D. Okla. 1972);
Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Investors Acceptance Co. v.
James Talcott, Inc., 454 S.W.2d 130 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1970).
28. I.T.T.-ndus. Credit Co. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, -, 229 S.E.2d 814,
820 (1976).
29. California Airmotive Corp. v. Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1969); Massey-Ferguson
Corp. v. Hamlin, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 142 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1971).
30. Goodwin v. Farmers Tractor & Equip. Co., 458 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Ark. 1970).
31. In re Zsa Zsa, Ltd. 352 F. Supp. 665, 671 (S.D.N.Y., 1972).
32. Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Furniture, Etc., 132 Ga. App. 661, -, 209 S.E.2d 63, 65
(1974), afd, 233 Ga. 934, 214 S.E.2d 373 (1975); J.F. England's Sons, Inc. v. Liggett, 152 N.W.2d
583, 586 (S.D. 1967).
33. Bulldog Concrete Forms Sales Corp. v. Taylor, 195 F.2d 417, 425 (7th Cir. 1952); Valley
Nat'l Bank v. Brooks, 3 Ariz. App. 340,414 P.2d 189, 192 (1966); Johnson Constr. Co. v. Cannon,
242 S.C. 42, 129 S.E.2d 750, 755 (1963).
34. Fardy v. Mayerstein, 221 Ind. 339, 47 N.E.2d 315 (1935), reh. denied, 221 Ind. 349, 47
N.E.2d 966 (1943); See also Arcola Sugar Mills Co. v. Burnham, 67 F.2d 981 (5th Cir. 1933), cer.
denied, 292 U.S. 630 (1934).
35. Louisville Trust Co..v. Drewry, 266 Ky. 279, 98 S.W.2d 900 (1936).
"36. Shuchman, Proft on Defaul, 22 STAN. L. REV. 20, 56 (1969).
37. Graham v. Northwestern Bank, 16 N.C. App. 287, -, 192 S.E.2d 109, 111 (1972).
[Vol. 13:820
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even slight deviations from the statutory prescription can lead to ver-
dicts for the debtor.38
Although it is of little immediate solace to Wilkerson, the court did
do future secured creditors a service in adopting the three-part guide-
line developed by the Supreme Court of Washington to determine the
commercial reasonableness of the publicity a seller gives a foreclosure
sale.39 To be commercially reasonable, the advertisements must be:
1) given to the public sufficiently in advance to allow inter-
ested bidders a reasonable opportunity to participate;
2) given to a public reasonably expected to have an interest
in the collateral to be sold and notifying the public of the ex-
act time and place of the sale reasonably convenient to poten-
tial bidders;
3) [given] in a manner reasonably calculated to assure...
that the collateral will bring the best possible price from the
competitive bidding of a lively concourse of bidders.4
This test should give secured sellers a better idea of what is ex-
pected of them in conducting their foreclosure sales. Considering what
happened to Wilkerson because of its failure to meet that standard, a
secured creditor who still intends to conduct such a sale would be well
advised to meticulously abide by those standards.
V. EFFECTS OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH U.C.C. SECTION 9-504
The U.C.C. has not brought about uniformity on the question of
what occurs when a secured creditor fails to comply with section 9-504
in disposing of the collateral. As indicated previously, section 9-507(1)
states that when the secured party fails to comply, the debtor may re-
cover damages. The disagreement is as to whether or not this is the
debtor's sole remedy. Many courts and commentators argue that an-
other possible remedy is to allow the debtor to use the creditor's non-
compliance as either a partial or total defense to the creditor's action
for a deficiency judgment.41
38. I.T.T.-Indus. Credit Corp. v. Milo Concrete Co., 31 N.C. App. 450, 229 S.E.2d 814
(1976) (incorrect date on notice); Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, -, 223 S.E.2d 848, 851
(1976) (inability to prove that notice was mailed to debtor).
39. Foster v. Knutson, 84 Wash. 2d 538, -, 527 P.2d 1108, 1114 (1974).
40. 580 P.2d at 509.
41. For commentary favoring the use of creditor misconduct as a total bar to the creditor's
action for a deficiency judgment, see II G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROP-
ERTY, § 44.9 at 1264 (1965); White, Representing the Low Income Consumer in Repossessions, Re-
sales, and Deficiency Judgment Cases, 64 Nw. U.L. REv. 808, 828 (1970); Clontz, Guide to a
Secured Creditors Remedies on a Debtor's Default, 7 U.C.C.LJ. 348, 369 (1975); Note, Creditor's
Defciency Judgment UnderArticle 9 o/the Uniform Commercial Co-e" Effect ofLack ofNotice and
1978]
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There are three general approaches taken in defining a debtor's
remedy when the secured party fails to comply with Part Five of the
U.C.C. Some jurisdictions allow a debtor to use this noncompliance as
a complete defense to the creditor's action for a deficiency judgment.
Others have held that the debtor's exclusive remedy is an affirmative
cause of action under U.C.C. section 9-507(1). Still others have held
that creditor misconduct creates a rebuttable presumption that the re-
possession discharged the debt, but these jurisdictions will allow the
secured party to recover a deficiency judgment if he can prove other-
wise. But even within those individual approaches, there are differ-
ences that require elaboration.
Approach Z" Bar the d§&ciency
The majority of the courts which have reached the conclusion that
the errant creditor should lose his right to a deficiency judgment have
done so on the theory that strict compliance with Part Five of Article
Nine of the U.C.C. is a prerequisite to collecting a deficiency judg-
ment.42 The requirements of Part Five (proper repossession,43 notice to
the debtor of the sale,' and a commercially reasonable resale45 ) are
viewed as elements of the creditor's prima facie case. Thus, when a
a Commercially Reasonable Sale, 33 MD. L. Rv. 327, 350 (1973); Note, Denial o/De icency: A
Problem ofReasonable Notice Under U. C C.§ 9-504(3), 34 OHIo STATE L.J. 657, 699 (1973); Note,
Debtor's Rights Against a Deicency Judgment Under Article Nine, 16 How. L.J. 148, 164 (1970);
40 TENN. L.R. 532 (1973).
For commentary opposing a total defense to the creditor's action for a deficiency judgment,
see J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 999 (1972); Minetz, May a Wrong-
Doer Recover a Deficiency, or is Section 9-507(1) a Debtor's Exclusive Remedy? 6 U.C.C.L.J. 344
(1974); Henszey, A4 Secured Creditor's Right to Collect a Deciency Judgment Under U C. C. Sec-
tion,9-504.A Needto Remedy the Impasse, 31 Bus. LAW. 2025, 2032 (1976); Note, Effect afLack of
Notice, 42 BROOKLYN L. REv. 56 (1975); 76 DICK L. REV. 394 (1972).
42. The jurisdictions which have barred the deficiency using the prerequiste theory are: DIS-
TRICT OF COLUMBIA: Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lloyd, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 15, 18 (D.C.
Super. 1973); FLORIDA: Turk v. St. Petersburg Bank & Trust Co., 281 So.2d 534, 536 (Fla. Ct.
App. 1973); GEORGIA: Granite Equip. Leasing Corp. v. Marina Dev. Corp., 139 Ga. App. 778,
230 S.E.2d 43 (1976); Gurwitch v. Luxurest Furniture Mfg. Co., 233 Ga. 934, 214 S.E.2d 373
(1975); Braswell v. American Nat'l Bank, 117 Ga. App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420 (1968); MAINE:
C.I.T. Corp. v. Haynes, 161 Me. 353, 212 A.2d 436 (1965); MASSACHUSETTS: One Twenty One
Credit Union v. Darcy, 40 Mass. App. Dec. 64 (1968); MICHIGAN: Cities Serv. Oil Co. v. Ferris,
9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 899, 903 (Mich. Dist. Ct. 1971); NEW MEXICO: Foundation Discounts v.
Serna, 81 N.M. 474, 468 P.2d 875 (1970); OKLAHOMA: Dynaelectron Crop. V. Jack Richards
Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659, 663 (W.D. Okla. 1972); Davidson v. First State Bank & Trust Co.,
559 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1976); PENNSYLVANIA; Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222
F. Supp. 696, 705 (W.D. Pa. 1963), modoedon other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1964); UTAH:
Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burns, 562 P.2d 233, 234 (Utah 1977); VIRGINIA: In re Bishop, 482
F.2d 381 (4th Cir. 1973); WYOMING: Aimovetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017, 1019-20 (Wyo. 1972).
43. U.C.C. § 9-503.
44. U.C.C. § 9-504(3).
45. Id.
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debtor successfully pleads creditor misconduct as a Code-based de-
fense, the creditor is denied any recovery.
A second group of courts arrive at the same result, but find the
source of the debtor's defense in pre-Code law which supplements the
Code through U.C.C. §1-103.46 This section states that unless the com-
mon law conflicts with a particular provision of the Code, the pre-Code
law is not displaced. According to these courts, since the pre-Code law
of many jurisdictions recognized an equitable defense of creditor mis-
conduct in deficiency actions, the authors of the Code would have said
that section 9-507(1) was the debtor's exclusive remedy if they had in-
tended it to be so.
A third group of cases holds that if the secured party fails to com-
ply with Part Five, it will be conclusively presumed that the repossessed
goods were taken in complete satisfaction of the debt.47 Thus, under
this theory, the debtor's defense is accord and satisfaction.
Approach 11 U C. C Section 9-507(1) is the Sole Remedy
Courts taking this approach hold that the secured party is entitled
to a deficiency judgment because the debtor has failed to pay his debt,
but hold that the debtor has an affirmative cause of action, if the credi-
tor breached his obligations under the Code.48 These courts hold that
46. The jurisdictions which allow the debtor to defeat the deficiency actions on a preCode
defense theory are: CALIFORNIA: Atlas Thrift Co. v. Horan, 27 Cal. App. 3d 999, -, 104 Cal.
Rprt., 315, 321 (1972). MAINE: Camden Nat'1 Bank v. St. Clair, 309 A.2d 329, 331-33 (Me.
1973); NEW YORK: Avis-Rent-A-Car System v. Franklin, 82 Misc. 2d 66, -, 366 N.Y.S.2d 83,
85 (App. Term. 1975); Leasco Data Processing Equip. v. Atlas Shirt Co., 66 Misc. 2d 1089,-, 323
N.Y.S.2d 13, 16 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
47. The jurisdictions which have barred a deficiency judgment on an accord and satisfaction
theory are: GEORGIA: Johnson v. Commercial Credit Corp., 117 Ga. App. 131, -, 159 S.E.2d
290, 291 (1968); Moody v. Nides Fin. Co., 115 Ga. App. 859, -, 156 S.E.2d 310, 311 (1967);
ILLINOIS: Morris Plan Co. v. Johnson, 271 N.E.2d 404, 408 (Ill. App. 1971); NEW YORK:
Associates Discount Corp. v. Cary, 47 Misc. 2d 369, 262 N.Y.S. 2d 646 (Civ. Ct. 1965).
48. The jurisdictions which have held that U.C.C. § 9-507(1) provides the debtor with his sole
remedy are: MASSACHUSETTS: Abbott Motors, Inc. v. Ralston, 28 Mass. App. Dec. 35, (1964);
MICHIGAN: Jones v. Morgan, 58 Mich. App. 35, 228 N.W.2d 419 (1975); Wilson Leasing Co. v.
Seaway Pharmacal Corp., 53 Mich. App. 359, 220 N.W.2d 83 (1974); MISSOURI: Wirth v.
Heavey, 508 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Mo. App. 1974); NEW MEXICO: Crosby v. Basin Motor Co., 83
N.M. 77, 488 P.2d 127 (1972); NEW YORK: Leasco v. Sheridan Indus., Inc., 82 Misc. 2d 897, 371
N.Y.S.2d 531 (Civ. Ct. 1975); PENNSYLVANIA: Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp.
797 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Alliance Discount v. Shaw, 195 Pa. Super Ct. 601, 171 A.2d 548 (1964); Atlas
Credit Corp. v. Dolbow, 193 Pa. Super. Ct. 649, 165 A.2d 704 (1963); Atlas Constr. Co. v. Dravo
Doyle Co., 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 124, 132 (Pa. C.P. 1965); TENNESSEE: Commercial Credit Corp.
v. Holt, 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 316 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1975); Massey-Ferguson Fin. Corp. v. Hamlin,
9 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 142 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1971); Mallicoat v. Volunteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 57
Tenn. App. 106, 415 S.W.2d 347 (1966); WASHINGTON: Grant County Tractor Co. v. Nss, 6
Wash. App. 866, 496 P.2d 966 (1972); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Wollgast, I1 Wash. App. 117,
521 P.2d 1191 (1974).
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section 9-507(1) conflicts with the notion of pre-Code defenses and that
section 1-103 is therefore inapplicable.
Approach IlL" A/low the Defciency, But Require the Secured
Par y to Prove the Value of the Collateral
Under this approach, the creditor is not completely barred from
receiving a deficiency judgment, but his misconduct raises a rebuttable
presumption that the collateral would have brought enough at a proper
resale to discharge the debt.49 This is the same theory as the accord and
satisfaction approach (barring the deficiency altogether), except that
here the creditor is allowed to prove a lower value for the collateral and
obtain a deficiency judgment based on that figure. This third ap-
proach also shares some of the reasoning of the prerequisite theory, but
rather than making compliance with Part Five a prerequisite for ob-
taining a deficiency judgment, compliance is seen as a prerequisite for
using the resale proceeds as the basis of damages. If the creditor fails
to meet the Code's resale requirements, he must independently prove
the amount that should be credited to the debt rather than having the
benefit of a presumption that the resale proceeds represent the appro-
priate amount.
49. This approach has been gaining the most support recently, and if any one of the ap-
proaches can be said to be the "trend", this is it. Those jurisdictions which have held that an
erring creditor is not barred from receiving a deficiency judgment if he can prove the value of the
repossessed collateral are: ALASKA: Koubuk Eng'r & Contr. Serv., Inc. v. Superior Tank & Con-
str., 568 P.2d 1007, 1013 (1977), Weaver v. O'Meara Motor Co. 452 P.2d 87, 92 (1969); ARKAN-
SAS: Farmers Equip. Co. v. Miller 252 Ark. 1091, -, 482 S.W.2d 805, 810 (1974), Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Rone 248 Ark. 665, -, 453 S.W.2d 37, 39 (1970), Carter v. Ryburn Ford
Sales Inc., 248 Ark. 236, -, 451 S.W.2d 199, 203 (1970), Baker v. Horn, 245 Ark. 310, -, 432
S.W.2d 21, 22 (1968); Norton v. National Bank of Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, -, 398 S.W.2d 21, of
Commerce, 240 Ark. 143, -, 398 S.W.2d 538, 542 (1966); COLORADO: Community Manage-
ment Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, -, 505 P.2d 1314, 1316-17 (1973); CONNECTICUT:
Savings Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn. Supp. 632, -, 382 A.2d 266, 228-29 (1978); ILLINOIS: Com-
mercial Discount Corp. v. Baker, 372 N.E.2d 926, 930 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978); General Foods Corp. v.
Hall, 39 Ill. App.3d 147, 153, 349 N.E.2d 573, 576-77 (1976); Tauber v. Johnson, 8 111. App. 3d 789,
- 291 N.E.2d 180, 184 (1972); INDIANA: Hall v. Owen County State Bank, 370 N.E.2d 918, 928
(Ind. App. 1978); MISSISSIPPI: Walker v. V.M. Box Motor Co. 325 So.2d 905, 906 (Miss. 1976);
NEBRASKA: Bank of Gering v. Glover, 192 Neb., 575, -, 223 N.W.2d 56, 59 (1974); Coronett v.
White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496,-, 209 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1973); NEVADA: Levers v. Rio King
Land Inv. Co., 560 P.2d 917, 920 (Nev. 1977); NEW JERSEY: Franklin State Bank v. Parker, 136
N.J. Super. 476, 346 A.2d 632 (Union County Ct. 1975); Conti Causeway Ford v. Jarossy, 114 N.J.
Super. 382, -, 276 A.2d 402, 404 (Ocean County Ct. 1971); T & W Ice Cream, Inc. v. Carriage
Barn, Inc., 107 NJ. Super. 328, 258 A.2d 162 (Bergan County Ct. 1969); NEW MEXICO: Clark
Leasing Corp. v. White Sands Forrest Prods., Inc., 535 P.2d 1077, 1082 (N.M. 1975); NEW
YORK: Security Trust Co. v. Thomas, 399 N.Y.S.2d 511, 514 (Sup. Ct., App. Div. 1977); NORTH
CAROLINA: Hodges v. Norton, 29 N.C. App. 193, -, 223 S.E.2d 848, 851 (1976). TENNES-
SEE: Investors Acceptance Co. v. James Tallcott, Inc., 61 Tenn. App. 307, 454 S.W.2d 130 (1969);
TEXAS: United States v. Whitehouse Plastics, 501 F.2d 692, 695 (5th Cir. 1974); VIRGINIA: In
re Thomas, 12 U.C.C. Rep. Sent. 578, 581 (W.D. Va. 1973).
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This approach is premised on the theory that barring the defi-
ciency altogether is unnecessarily harsh and amounts to punitive dam-
ages, which are thought not to belong in a contract setting.50
Nevertheless, the secured party is in a better position to prove what a
proper resale would have brought, and so he should bear the conse-
quences of a failure of proof on this issue.5
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has used the prerequisite theory to
bar a deficiency judgment before,5" and appears to have done so again
in Wilkerson.53 The unique result in Wilkerson was that in addition to
allowing the debtor to use the creditor's misconduct as a shield to bar
the deficiency, they simultaneously allowed him to use that misconduct
as a sword to collect damages under section 9-507(1). Although this
appears to be unprecedented, 54 it is entirely consistent with the reason-
ing of the prerequisite theory for barring the creditor's action. This
consistency itself presents a strong argument for why that logic is erro-
neous.
If the prerequisite theory is correct, then a showing that the credi-
tor has not conducted a commercially reasonable resale, or that he has
not given the debtor adequate notice of the sale, defeats his prima facie
case and he should not be entitled to a deficiency judgment. At the
same time, the debtor is able to make out his case under section 9-
50. Coronett v. White Motor Corp., 190 Neb. 496, -, 209 N.W.2d 341, 344 (1973).
51. Id. at N.W.2d 343; Community Management Ass'n v. Tousley, 32 Colo. App. 33, 505
P.2d 1314, 1316 (1973).
52. Davidson v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 559 P.2d 1228, 1231 (1976); see also:
Dynaelectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659, 663 (W.D. Okla. 1972).
53. 580 P.2d at 509.
54. The problem of what to do when a debtor attempts to use the creditor's misconduct both
as a defense and as an afiative cause of action has arisen before both in jurisdictions which bar
the deficiency and in those which allow it. In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Burns, 562 P.2d 233 (Utah
1977), where the deficiency was barred, the court remanded the case back to the trial court to find
whether the consumer/debtor still had any damages in view of the dismissal of the creditor's
action for a deficiency judgment. Similarly, in an earlier Oklahoma case where the court said that
it would bar deficiency judgments for noncomplying creditors, the damages that the debtor sought
under § 9-507(1) were for injury to his business caused by the creditor's wrongful repossession
rather than merely for additional credit he should have received on the sale of the collateral.
Davidson v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 559 P.2d 1228, 1231 (Okla. 1976). See also Skeels v.
Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 222 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Savings Bank v. Booze, 34 Conn.
Supp. 632, -, 382 A.2d 226, 228-29 (1977); Walker v. V.M. Box Motor Co. 325 So.2d 905, 906
(Miss. 1976).
The best approach taken by a jurisdiction which shifts the burden but which allows the defi-
ciency judgment if the creditor can prove what the value of the collateral, was in Conti Causeway
Ford v. Jarossy, 114 NJ. Super 382, -, 276 A.2d 402, 405 (1971). There the court held that
shifting the burden of proof and receiving damages under § 9-507(l) were, in effect, alternatives.
It was also held that the difference between what the creditor would have gotten if the deficiency
was based on the resale amount and what he got as a result of the shifted burden would be set off
against any recovery the debtor got under § 9-507(l).
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507(1). This allows the debtor a double recovery in the case where a
proper resale would have resulted in some deficiency. In such a case,
one of the recoveries must be viewed as punitive in nature. This could
be justified as protecting consumers by penalizing overreaching credi-
tors.5 5 However, this type of consumer protection would be very erratic,
because it would allow only a single recovery to consumers whose col-
lateral either did or should have netted a surplus at resale.
This problem can be illustrated by means of some hypotheticals.
All cases assume the following sale: Debtor (D) buys a car from Credi-
tor (C) who perfects a security interest in the car. The cash price of
the car is $3,000 and the time price differential (interest) is $500, yield-
ing a total contract price of $3500.
Case I: D makes a downpayment of $200 but does not pay any of
the installments. He successfully puts off C long enough for the car to
depreciate by $500. C then repossesses the car, now worth $2,500, and
sells it without advertising for $2,000. C credits D's account with
$2,000 and that, plus the $200 D has already paid, leaves a deficiency
of $1,300 ($3,500 - $2,200 = $1,300), which C sues for. D defends
and counterclaims on the basis of Cs failure to comply with the public
sale provisions of the Code and wins.
In State X, U.C.C. section 9-507(1) is D's sole remedy. Here, D
wins on his counterclaim and is awarded $800. (Time price differential
= $500; ten percent of the cash price = $300; $500 + $300 = $800.)
But C also wins his deficiency judgment of $1,300. (These hypotheti-
cals disregard any attorney fees which might be awarded.5 6) In this case
D is out $700, ($200 downpayment + $500 difference in judgments) but
has had the use of the car from the date of purchase until it was repos-
sessed, during which time it depreciated by $500. C is out $800, which
is slightly more than the amount by which he injured D. (C sold D's
car, which was worth $2,500, for only $2,000.) Both are "wrongdoers,"
and both are out something.
In state Y, however, D gets both a sword and a shield. Now D
wins his counterclaim for $800, and C is barred from collecting a defi-
55. Typically, this argument is used in support of allowing the debtor to defeat the deficiency
judgment itself. See Shuchman, Profit on Default, 22 STAN. L. REv. 20, 56 (1969); Note, Credl.
tor's Defciency Judgment Under Article 9 ofthe Uniform Commercial Code: Effect fLack ofNo-
tice and a Commercially Reasonable Sale, 33 MD. L. Rav. 327, (1973). Thus far, it does not
appear that any courts or commentators have asserted it as an argument for both denying the
deficiency and allowing an affirmative cause of action simultaneously.
56. The U.C.C. allows the creditor to recover attorneys' fees under § 9-504(1)(a). Oklahoma
also allows the trial court discretion in awarding attorneys' fees to either party in suit based upon a
contract for the sale of goods. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 936 (1971).
[Vol. 13:820
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ciency. In this situation, D has a profit of $600 and has used the car
free. C, however, is in a bad situation. He has received a total of
$2,200 (receipt from resale + downpayment), has paid D $800, but he
has neither his car nor his profit, and he has lost some expenses. C is
out $2,100. (Received $2,200 - $800 = $1,400; Expected $3,500.)
Case II: In this case D almost has the car paid off when he de-
faults. Now D has paid $3,000, and at the time he defaults the car has
a fair market value of $700. Assuming the same amount of larceny in
C's heart, his unreasonable sale now nets $200, and he sues for his $300
deficiency. Assuming that a reasonable sale would have netted the fair
market value, D would owe no deficiency, and C would owe D the
surplus $200. In this case, C seems to be much more deserving of
punitive damages, but in the state with the puntive damage theory he
will be in a better position.
In State X, where D only got section 507(1) damages, C is still out
$800 (he collects the deficiency, thus receiving his full $3,500, but he
has paid $800 in damages to D), and D has used the car and paid
$2,500 during an amount of time in which the car depreciated by
$2,300. But in State Y, C is out $1,100, ($800 damages + $300 defi-
ciency) while D has paid $2,200 ($3,000 payments of the car - $800
received in damages,) and used the car while it depreciated by $2,300.
In the two hypotheticals, C acted in approximately the same man-
ner, but if there is a meaningful difference, his conduct with the debtor
who had almost paid off the car was more reprehensible than his con-
duct with the debtor who only paid his downpayment. But the creditor
in Case I is out $2,100 in a double recovery state while in Case II he is
only out half that much. And it can get worse: If the unreasonable
resale does recover enough to pay off the debt, indicating that the value
of the collateral at the time of repossession is worth more than the debt,
the double recovery state does not punish the creditor at all. He pays
only once, since there is no deficiency to bar.
The irrationality of a punitive damage scheme so wholly unrelated
to the evil it punishes is a strong argument against allowing the debtor
to use the creditor's misconduct as both a defense and an affirmative
cause of action simultaneously. But if strict compliance with the stat-
ute is an element of the creditor's case in a deficiency proceeding, and if
the Code recognizes a separate cause of action for creditor misconduct,
then an irrational punitive damages system is the result. On the other
hand, if section 9-507(1) is viewed as providing a minimum recovery
for consumers, to be exceeded if the consumer can either prove higher
1978]
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actual damages or when he can find an alternative remedy that offers
greater protection, then section 9-507(1) is no penalty at all. Rather, it
operates to protect the consumer by easing his burden of proof on an
otherwise highly speculative point. The consumer would simply be re-
lieved of the burden of showing what price the collateral would have
brought at a commercially reasonable resale. But when he could show
that element, he would be allowed to do so.
However irrational it is, there is some evidence that the framers of
the Uniform Consumer Credit Code 8 (U.C.C.C.) intended to permit a
double recovery, at least in some cases. Under the U.C.C.C., the credi-
tor is not entitled to a deficiency judgment when the collateral is low-
priced consumer goods.5 9 But in the event of a repossession, the debtor
is still entitled to insist that there be a resale of the collateral.60 In that
situation, there would still be a resale under U.C.C. section 9-504, and
the creditor would still be liable for damages under U.C.C. section 9-
507(1). Here, the debtor would not be asserting the creditor's miscon-
duct as both a defense and an affimative cause of action; he would be
asserting U.C.C.C. section 5-103 as his defense and U.C.C. section 9-
507 (1) as his offense. But even this result is partially avoided if
U.C.C. section 9-507(1) is viewed as providing only the alternative of
minimum damages.
At least one commentator has come to the conclusion that there is
no logical solution to the problem as the laws are now written, and that
we are at an impasse. 61 His solution would be to eliminate U.C.C. sec-
tion 9-507(1) altogether, deny deficiencies on consumer goods worth
less than $1,500 at the time of sale, and require other creditors to show
compliance with the U.C.C. provisions as a prerequisite to recovery of
a deficiency.62 This would eliminate the double recovery aspects of the
57. See note 51 supra.
58. Uniform Consumer Credit Code (1968 version). In Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A.
,§ 1-101 through 9-103 (1971 & Supp. 1977). [Hereinafter U.C.C.C.]
59. U.C.C.C. § 5.103. In the 1968 version, the deficiency judgment was barred whenever the
creditor voluntarily accepted the return of collateral, if the original cash sale price was $1,000 or
less. Under the 1974 version of the U.C.C.C., the figure is $1,750. However, this seems to be a
favorite area for non-uniform provisions and there are almost as many configurations as there are
adopting jurisdictions.
Even bolder results are reached in California and Washington where deficiency judgments
are barred in all consumer goods sales. See CAL. Civ. CODE § 1812.5 (Supp. 1977) (West), and
WASH. REV. CODE § 62A 9-501(1) (1976). See also ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 1/2 §§ 556, 580
(Supp. 1977) (barring deficiency judgments for automobiles).
60. U.C.C. § 9-505.
61. Henszey, A Secured Creditor's Right to Collect a Defciency Judgment Under UCC Section
9-504-A Need to Remedy the Impasse, 31 Bus. LAw. 2025 (1976).
62. Id. at 2032.
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problem, but it would still leave the measure of damages wholly unre-
lated to the harm and it would deny damages to the debtor whose col-
lateral did pay off the debt but with less of a surplus than should have
been recovered. Thus, a preferable approach would be to allow sec-
tion 9-507(1) damages only as an alternative to denying a deficiency.
VI. DEALING WITH THE PROBLEM IN OKLAHOMA
It may be that Oklahoma's position on deficiencies and the errant
creditor is not that firmly entrenched. In Wilkerson, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court did affirm the sword and shield approach taken by the
trial court, but the point was nearly ignored by the court6 3 and may not
have been argued by the litigants. Certainly the court articulated no
rationale for allowing the debtor to use the same conduct as both a
defense and an affirmative cause of action. In fact the Oklahoma
courts have never clearly articulated their rationale for deciding that
U.C.C. section 9-507(1) was not the debtor's exclusive remedy.
The genesis of that decision is a federal district case from
Oklahoma's Western District which cites Anderson" for the proposi-
tion that proof of a commercially reasonable resale is a condition pre-
cedent for collection of a deficiency judgment.65 Neither the district
court nor Anderson offers any reason or rationale for the statement, nor
do they cite any other authority for a proposition that does not repre-
sent a unanimous position among the jurisdictions.66 The only other
indication that Oklahoma regards proof of a commercially reasonable
resale as a part of the creditor's prima facie case for a deficiency judg-
ment came in a case where the creditor was not seeking a deficiency
judgment.67 Once again the court did not analyze the question, but
rather simply made the statement gratuitously and cited the federal dis-
trict case as authority.68
63. The parties seemingly argued only the question of commercial reasonableness. The ap-
pellant's brief (Wilkerson's) treats the question as a defense to his cause of action (appellant's brief
at 14) but tha appellee refers to U.C.C. § 9-507(1) as a statutory penalty. It is therefore not clear
whether the parties addressed the issue or not.
64. R. ANDERSON, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-504:28 (2d ed. 1971).
65. Dynalectron Corp. v. Jack Richards Aircraft Co., 337 F. Supp. 659, 663 (W.D. Okla.
1972).
66. Cf. Mercantile Fin. Corp. v. Miller, 292 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1968); Mallicoat v. Vol-
unteer Fin. & Loan Corp., 415 S.W.2d 347 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966); California Airmotive Corp. v.
Jones, 415 F.2d 554 (9th Cir. 1969); Investors Acceptance Co. v. James Talcott, Inc., 61 Tenn.
App. 88, 454 S.W.2d 130 (1970).
67. Davidson v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 559 P.2d 1230, 1231 (Okla. 1976).
68. Id. at 1231.
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It is possible that the Oklahoma Supreme Court would still be re-
ceptive to the argument that a creditor is suing on a contractual obliga-
tion, that his prima facie case is proof of the debt and that it has not
been paid, and that the remedy for creditor misconduct is an affirma-
tive cause of action and not a defense to the debt. Even if the court
was unwilling to go that far, it could be argued that the remedies are
alternative remedies and that Wilkerson should not be binding because
the parties did not argue the question, and the court did not fully ana-
lyze the issue. Otherwise, if the case does represent binding precedent,
it should be overruled.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Wilkerson Motor Co., Inc. v. Johnson, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court set forth useful guidelines for determining what a secured credi-
tor must do in order to conduct a commercially reasonable resale of
repossessed collateral. Although the case dealt only with the question
of how much publicity the creditor must give such a sale, the guidelines
can also be helpful in determining other questions concerning the con-
duct of public sales (such as where and when they should be held). In
this regard, the decision is laudable and indicates that the court is will-
ing to go considerably further than previous courts in holding the credi-
tor responsible for insuring that the debtor gets fair credit for his
collateral.
Nevertheless, the case also indicates that the court is drifting into
uncharted waters by allowing double recoveries to certain defaulting
debtors and penalizing certain secured creditors on a basis wholly unre-
lated to their culpability or innocence. To this extent, the decision is a
bad one; its effects are highly speculative and do not appear to have
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